CyberCIEGE - Network Security Training Tool (archived) by The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
2006
CyberCIEGE - Network Security Training Tool
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49120
6/30/16, 8:49 AMCISR - Research Projects - CyberCIEGE
Page 1 of 3https://web.archive.org/web/20060323222817/http://cisr.nps.navy.mil/projects/cyberciege.html
The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research
  RESEARCH: Projects - CyberCIEGE
CyberCIEGE 
The purpose of the CyberCIEGE project is to create an
Information Assurance (IA) teaching/learning laboratory. In
addition to rigorous scientific foundations, it involves the
application of abstract principles to the real world. A hands-on
virtual laboratory provides a dynamic and often surprising context
where abstract principles can be applied and discovered.
CyberCIEGE packages an information assurance laboratory as an
interactive, entertaining, commercial-grade PC-based computer
game where players construct and defend a networked computing
system. Students will select information technology resources to
meet explicit needs of virtual "users", and defend the resulting
system from both vandals and professional attackers.
Visit the official CyberCIEGE Game Site 
Strategy
The first (and recurring) lesson the player must learn is an understanding of the security policy :
what resources are being protected, and who are they being protected from? Once the player
understands the sensitivity, (e.g., value) of the assets (e.g., information), the player makes
choices that affect the protection of the assets in accordance with the security policy. 
The single most important set of decisions the player makes involves preventing direct or
indirect access to highly sensitive assets by people who should be constrained from accessing
such assets. Whenever presented with an opportunity, professional attackers (e.g., spies,
industrial espionage agents, etc.) will employ tools such as malicious software to compromise
the sensitive assets. Separating highly sensitive assets onto a physically isolated network1 (i.e.,
the "Sensitive Data Network") is one solution that avoids massive losses, however it leads to
operational inefficiencies and user complaints due to an inability to share information across
sensitivities in real time. An alternate solution that prevents massive loss while permitting
controlled sharing involves the use of components that enforce a mandatory access control
policy with a high degree of assurance.The challenge with this alternative is a considerable lack
of availability compliant products. A variety of other alternatives are available to the player --
each advertised as enabling controlled sharing of data in real-time while protecting highly
sensitive information -- but each of these alternatives results in massive loss from suitably
motivated professional attackers. 
Other player decisions and actions have more to do with ensuring that application programs are
protected from unexpected input data, resulting in malicious or otherwise unintended behavior
by the application itself. At least as important as (if not more important than) the technical
solutions chosen by the player are the choices related to communicating with users.
Understanding how the system users access assets, training users, coordinating changes and
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productive and relatively free of disaster. 
Once the basics of the game are mastered, game-play converges on distinctions between "highly
sensitive" assets and "moderately sensitive" assets.This is where losses will occur most. Moving
moderate-to-highly sensitive assets to the Sensitive Data Network results in less compromised
by professional attackers. However, if there are limited means of sharing assets in real-time
across the networks, user productivity suffers. On the other hand, leaving border-line highly
sensitive assets on the Non-sensitive Data Network and improving its protection beyond some
basic level will consume considerable resources (the player's budget)and only achieve modest
gains in real security. A significant lesson in this part of the game is that attempts to create a
"protected intranet" for "moderately sensitive" assets through the use of firewalls will fail to
protect the assets from professional attackers who employ malicious software. On the other
hand, actually creating a third, "Semi-Sensitive Data Network" can succeed if the
interconnections with other networks adhere to the security policy and are enforced with a high
degree of assurance. But again, such choices can adversely effect the ability to share data in
real-time unless components enforcing mandatory access controls are deployed. 
Protecting data within the Sensitive Data Network from people who are authorized to access the
Sensitive data network is a different facet of the game. Here, authentication, audit and
discretionary access control mechanisms are used to enforce a discretionary access control
policy. Also, there are potentially well-motivated malicious insiders who try to gather together a
lot of the highly sensitive assets with seriously hostile intent (e.g., to sell to competitors). Most
protection mechanisms deployed to thwart this activity are defeated if the motive is strong
enough, with the only successful solution being the introduction of additional mandatory
sensitivity levels and the use of additional separate networks and/or components providing high
assurance mandatory access controls. 
The most substantial variation on the game is the introduction of mandatory data integrity
policies. Initially in the game, the meaning of "highly sensitive" relates to the secrecy of the
assets, e.g., information that is valuable because it is a secret such as a proprietary
manufacturing process. Within a single network (e.g., the Non-sensitive Data Network) integrity
issues do arise in the context of a discretionary policy (e.g., someone mistakenly -- or
deliberately -- altering someone else's data). Enforcing a mandatory integrity policy is a very
different challenge. While it remains the case that much can be achieved by separating the
highly sensitive assets onto a distinct Sensitive Data Network, the set of people with potential
access to the assets now grows to include each author of software and data that resides on the
Sensitive Data Network. 
1By "physically isolated" we mean just that. Many networks that are advertised as being physically isolated (e.g.,
secret military networks) are in fact interconnected to other networks using "filter" or "guard" components that
permit information to "flow up" (and in some cases, the implement "sanitization policies" that permit information
to "flow down"). Some of these interconnection components employ high assurance mandatory access controls.
An example of physical isolation that does permit one-way data flow is an optical diode. 
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